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Abstract
This Article traces the evolution of the definiteness requirement over the course of two centuries. From the time of inventions
relating to flour mills, the definiteness requirement evolved into the
consequence for drafting uninterpretable claims. Without considering the reasons for this evolution, the Supreme Court in its Nautilus
decision returned the standard for assessing definiteness to its root
form. Given the consequences are the loss of patent rights, this Article grapples with the Supreme Court’s decision during an era where
complex and convergent technologies are more commonplace. The
Article also analyzes empirical evidence six years before and six
years after the Nautilus decision to forecast its impact as we head
deeper into the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1870s, inventors were finding new ways to improve steampowered engines for locomotives.1 In 2021, inventors are working to
1. In 1876, Anatole Mallet, a French engineer, introduced a method of using
two steam powered cylinders (“compound locomotive”) for railway locomotives.
The design significantly increased power and adhesion. See DANIEL KINNEAR
CLARK, THE STEAM ENGINE: A TREATISE ON STEAM ENGINES AND BOILERS 603
(1891) (citing M.A. Mallet, On the Compounding of Locomotive Engines, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTION OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS 328 (1879).
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further the emerging space travel market.2 Not surprisingly, the speed
and complexity of innovation in what has been deemed the Fourth Industrial Revolution (“4IR”)3 is unparalleled. However, what is surprising is the fact that the definiteness requirement has remained largely
unchanged since 1870.4
Circa 1870, judges were seemingly undaunted by the challenges
associated with assessing patented technology. In one case concerning
enablement, the Supreme Court confidently announced that with the
evidentiary record in hand, including the testimony of those skilled in
the art, it had no difficulty grasping the patented invention.5 Years
later, the Court opined that disclosing the “dominate idea” of the invention suffices for purposes of definiteness.6 During World War I,
the Court added that “the certainty which the law requires in [the patent claims] is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their
subject-matter.”7 At issue was a process of recovering “ores” from
gangue8 by introducing “oily liquid” and “agitating” the “mixture.”9
During World War II, the Court addressed claims directed to “pure
carbon black” used in manufacturing rubber.10 The Court held that in
order to satisfy the definiteness requirement, claims must be “reasonably clear-cut” to help the court determine whether “novelty and

2. Micah Maidenberg & Doug Cameron, Blue Origin Launch: Jeff Bezos and
Crew Complete Successful Space Flight, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jeff-bezos-blue-origin-crew-set-for-space-debut11626775480?page=1 [perma.cc/RFS7-KVMD].
3. The term Fourth Industrial Revolution has been attributed to Klaus Schwab,
founder of the World Economic Forum. See KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2015).
4. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 902 (2014). While
the Nautilus Court was referencing the fact that the statutory provision has remained
unchanged, as discussed in this paper, the legal framework stemming from that provision has also remained largely unchanged.
5. Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586 (1881) (The patent was
directed to improvements in a loom for weaving fabric.).
6. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 437 (1902) (applying
the observations of Justice Bradley in Webster Loom).
7. Mins. Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916).
8. Gangue is the commercially valueless mineral matter occurring with the desired ore in a vein or deposit. Gangue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gangue [https://perma.cc/F4GV-93ML].
9. Mins. Separation, 242 U.S. at 263 (“the claimed discovery of the patent-insuit relates ‘to improvements in the concentration of ores, the object being to separate metalliferous matter, graphite, and the like from gangue by means of oils, fatty
acids, or other substances which have a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter
over gangue.’”).
10. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942).
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invention are genuine” and avoid a “zone of [proprietary] uncertainty”
that would undermine “enterprise and experimentation.”11
Five decades later, the 4IR technological landscape is teeming
with complex, rapidly evolving, and interdependent technologies. Information and communications technology (“ICT”) as well as the Internet of Things (“IoT”) drive the 4IR technological landscape.
Against this backdrop, the standard for indefiniteness gradually became more difficult to uniformly apply. For this reason, the Federal
Circuit in 2002 significantly modified the standard. However, in 2014,
the Supreme Court changed the standard for definiteness back to what
it was 72 years earlier.12 On remand, the Federal Circuit remarked that
“we may now steer by a ‘bright star’ rather than an ‘unreliable compass.’”13 The historical evolution of definiteness as well as the technology and market conditions in the 4IR demonstrate that the difference is not trivial.
II. THE DEFINITENESS REQUIREMENT
A. Definiteness in the Nineteenth Century
The Patent Act of 1790, the very first patent act in the United
States, planted the seed for the definiteness requirement the 1790 Patent Act required patentees to file a written specification “containing
a description . . . of the thing or things . . . invented or discovered,”
which “shall be so particular” as to “distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used.”14 The definiteness
seed soon germinated into the Patent Act of 1793.15 That Act included
a provision that an inventor “shall deliver a written description of [the]
invention . . . in full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same
from all other things before known . . . .”16 In the years that followed,
patent practitioners added separate sentences in the specification, referred to as “claims,” to identify the invention.17 However, this practice was often form over substance. By way of example, the Supreme
Court reviewed the following claim: “I claim the above-described new
11.
12.
13.
2015).
14.
15.
16.
17.
2012).

Id. at 236–37.
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911 (2014).
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
Patent Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 110 (1790).
Patent Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318–23 (1793).
Id.
See generally R. MOY, WALKER ON PATENTS § 4.2, 4-17 to 4-20 (4th ed.
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manufacturer of deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils . . . by treating
them substantially as herein before described.”18 It was not uncommon
for a number of known elements to be recited only to be followed by
a catch-all reference to the specification.19 Without established rules
concerning definiteness, claim drafting, or claim construction, adjudicating the scope of the invention was disparate and subjective.
In 1822, in Eaton v. Evans,20 the Supreme Court grappled with
the issue of claim coverage over an improvement to an apparatus. The
claim at issue recited in part “the peculiar properties or principles
which the machine possesses . . . .”21 In evaluating the scope of the
claimed invention, the Court required that patentees “explain what is
the nature or limit of the improvement . . . claim[ed].”22 The Court reasoned that doing so will “guard against prejudice or injury from the
use of an invention which [an accused infringer] may otherwise innocently support not to be patented.”23 Congress codified Evans in the
years that followed. In the Patent Act of 1836, Congress for the first
time required inventors to set out their inventions with “particularity.”24 However, at this time claims were still optional.25 In the Patent
Act of 1870, Congress expressly required that patent claims have particularity and distinctiveness.26
The definiteness requirement from the Patent Act of 1870 remains
“largely unaltered.”27 Yet, the early Supreme Court decisions yield the
18. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (evaluated the definiteness of
this claim).
19. See, e.g., Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. 212, 215 (1853) (claim 1 of U.S. Pat. No.
5315x recites “the employment of rotary planes substantially such as herein described, in combination with rollers or any analogous device to prevent the board
from being drawn up by the planes when cutting upward or from the reduced or
planed to the unplaned surface, as described”); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419
(1891) (“in the manner shown or described, and for or with the purposes set forth.”).
20. 20 U.S. 356, 357 (1822).
21. Id. at 398.
22. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
25. See Joseph Mueller, Claims as Pointers: The Statutory Approach to Claim
Construction, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. 501, 504 (2005); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378–79 (1996); RISDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS, §§ 3–4
(1949).
26. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870) (requiring inventors to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the improvement, or combination
which [the inventor] claims as [their] invention or discovery”).
27. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 902 (2014) The Patent Act of 1952 modified the phraseology to convey the same requirement: patent
applicants were required to sum up the specification with “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
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conclusion that the definiteness requirement was merely a rationale in
want of a legal framework. As noted above, claims were not required
until the Patent Act of 1870. Hence, given the infancy of claim drafting
fundamentals, to the extent claims were even included in the disclosure, uniformity was impracticable. However, it was also apparent that
the Court was attempting to regulate the scope of the patent grant but
without guideposts. In 1871, the Court in Seymour v. Osborne set forth
four abstract categories of invention.28 The Court then enumerated
corresponding rules regarding definiteness relative to those categories.29 The category and rules did not offer much. Without analysis of
the claims-in-suit, the Court proclaimed that “it is clear that the [definiteness] objection cannot prevail in respect to any one of the several
letters patent on which the suit is founded.”30 These early cases exposed the challenges of uniformly applying the definiteness requirement.
B. Definiteness in the Twentieth Century
Minerals Separation v. Hyde is an early twentieth-century case
that provided high-level guidance on the definiteness requirement.31
There, the patent-in-suit discloses a process that efficiently and economically separates ore from gangue.32 The point of novelty is agitating a mixture of pulverized ore in water and then introducing air bubbles by agitating.33 Unlike the prior art, much less oil can be added if

regards as [their] invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2 (2006). The Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, which was largely directed to harmonizing the U.S. patent laws with
that of other industrialized nations, did not alter the definiteness requirement of the
Patent Act of 1952. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 4, 125
Stat. at 296 (merely renumbering the previous § 112 ¶2 with § 112(b)).
28. 78 U.S. 516, 541 (1870).
29. Id. (discussing the four categories as follows: an invention that embraces the
entire machine and therefore requires claims that are co-extensive with the invention; an invention that is one part of a machine thereby requiring the patentee to
specify the individual parts; a new ingredient in an old combination thereby requiring more particularity, not only in the new ingredient, but also in the new combination; and where all ingredients are old and the invention is a new combination, the
patentee must identify the new combination, the ingredients, the mode of operation,
and new and useful result).
30. Id. at 542.
31. 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916).
32. Id. at 265–66.
33. Id. at 267–69 (discussing three other claims that recited additional limitations
such as introduction of heat, and various acids).
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desired. By utilizing the patented process, the cost of separating out
the ore from gangue was unexpectedly and substantially reduced.34
The procedural history reflects the difficulties of applying the law
of definiteness. The district court held that the claims 1–3, 5–7, 8–11,
and 12 were valid and infringed.35 It held that the patent specification
and claims adequately distinguished the prior art.36 While the district
court noted some obstructive behavior by defendants, it did not treble
damages.37 The Ninth Circuit reversed.38 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
the claims did not distinguish the prior art for purposes of anticipation.39 The Ninth Circuit expressly criticized the district court for giving too much deference to the monetary success of the patented invention in other countries.40
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit.41 It relied upon expert testimony that established the
process was novel and simplistic while producing unexpected and
cost-effective results.42 The Court noted that the “[invention] was immediately accepted as so great an advance over any process known
before” and that “it promptly came into extensive use for the concentrations of ores,” including in at least five principal mining countries.43
However, the intrinsic record does not support this holding. The patent-in-suit44 has only two figures, both of which are directed to an
apparatus. The specification generally discloses a few different processes via operation of the apparatus. It is lacking in detail in relation
to the claim limitations.45
The Court noted that “the composition of ores varies infinitely,
each one presenting its special problem, and it is obviously impossible
to specify in a patent the precise treatment which would be most successful and economical in each case.”46 The Court also noted that there
was a significant amount of prior art concerning the treatment of
34. Id. at 266.
35. Mins. Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 207 F. 956, 962 (D. Mont. 1913) (claims 4,
8, and 11 were not asserted).
36. Id. at 960–61.
37. Id. at 962.
38. Hyde v. Mins. Separation, Ltd., 214 F. 100 (9th Cir. 1914).
39. See Hyde, 214 F. at 109.
40. Id. at 107–08.
41. See Mins. Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 272 (1916).
42. Id. at 270.
43. Id.
44. U.S. Patent No. 835,120 (filed May 29, 1905) (issued November 6, 1906).
45. Id.
46. Mins. Separation, 242 U.S. at 271.
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ores.47 Based on the record, the Court concluded that the claims are
“sufficiently definite to guide those skilled in the art to its successful
application, as the evidence abundantly shows.”48 The Court reasoned
that the “certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than
is reasonable, having regard to their subject matter.”49 Hence, use of
the word “subject matter” seemingly validated weight on extrinsic evidence as opposed to detailed scrutiny of the intrinsic record.
In 1942, the Court offered additional high-level insight on definiteness. In United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,50 the patentin-suit51 reduces carbon dust liberated during the handling of carbon
black, which is used for making rubber products such as tires.52 The
dust hampered tire production, but efforts to eliminate it were unsuccessful. The Fourth Circuit noted that the approaches resulted in an
unusable form of carbon black.53 The inventors solved the problem
using a process resulting in a product consisting of carbon black aggregates that did not release carbon dust during subsequent processing.54 There were additional advantages to “substantially pure carbon black.”55 At issue were claims directed to a product, namely
“substantially pure carbon black.”56 The Court relied on the testimony
47. Id. at 264.
48. Id. at 271. The Court relied upon Ives v. Hamilton, 92 U.S. 426 (1875). In
Ives, the Court analyzed the individual components and reasoned that the evidence
was sufficient because “[a]ny good mechanic acquainted with the construction of
sawmills, and having the patent and diagram before him, would have no difficult in
adopting the [patented] improvement.”
49. Id. at 270. By today’s standard, the claims of the patent-in-suit considering
the disclosure were unbounded. Claim one read in its entirety “[t]he herein-described
process of concentrating ores which consists in mixing the powered ore with
slightly-acidified water, adding a small portion of oily liquid having a preferential
affinity for metalliferous matter, (amounting to a fraction of one per cent. on the
ore), agitating the mixture until the oil-coated mineral matter forms into a froth, and
separating the froth from the remainder of the fry flotation.”
50. 317 U.S. 228, 229 (1942).
51. U.S. Pat. No. 1,889,429 (filed Dec. 2, 1927).
52. United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 234 n.5 (“The main object of our patented invention is to secure carbon black having the desired dispersive properties, greater
density, freedom from dust, freedom from gritty particles, less absorbed or occluded
gases, reduced oil absorption than the ordinary powder form, and capable of considerable handling without crushing or dusting.”).
53. Binney & Smith Co. v. United Carbon Co., 125 F.2d 255, 256 (4th Cir.
1942), rev’d, 317 U.S. 223 (1942).
54. Id.
55. ’429 Patent col. 2 l. 62–80.
56. United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 231–32. See ’429 Patent col. 7 l. 8–15, both
claims are terse. Claim 1 in its entirety recites “[s]ustantially [sic] pure carbon black
in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded, smooth aggregates having a spongy porous interior.” Claim 2 in its entirety claims “[a]s an article
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of an inventor and corroborating testimony of other witnesses to construe limitations such as “substantially pure,” “commercially uniform,” “comparatively small,” “spongy,” “porous,” “pellet,” and “approximately one-sixteenth of an inch in diameter.”57 After reviewing
the claim construction, the Court then turned to the issue of definiteness. The Court opined that both claims in question failed to distinguish the prior art and “clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from
future enterprise.”58 The Court added that “the claims must be reasonably clear-cut to enable courts to determine whether novelty and invention are genuine.”59 Yet, the patent specification suggests that the
term “substantially pure carbon black” might help distinguish it from
“carbon black.”60 The Court did not broach this potential interpretation. It instead focused on the issue de jure, the impropriety of functional claims.61
United Carbon and Minerals Separation reflect a subjective and
visceral approach to definiteness.62 The cases seemingly turn on extraneous facts.63 In Minerals Separation, the opinions of three
of manufacture, a pellet of approximately one-sixteenth of an inch in diameter and
formed of a porous’ mass, of substantially pure carbon black.”
57. United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 233–34.
58. Id. at 236.
59. Id.
60. The patent-in-suit, ’429 Patent col. 4 l. 118–19, distinguishes “substantially
pure carbon black” from “carbon black.” Although, it also discloses that “the present
invention can be employed to manufacture “carbon black” having particular properties. The issue of a special definition for purposes of claim construction was addressed as early as 1919. See Dayton Eng’g Laboratories Co. v. Kent, 260 F. 187,
194 (E.D. Pa. 1919) (defendant could not escape infringement by limiting the interpretation of “iron coil” given the special meaning provided by the inventor); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refin. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 5–6 (7th Cir. 1943),
aff’d, 322 U.S. 471 (1944); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things. To
overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.”).
61. See United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 234 (“So read, the claims are but inaccurate
suggestions of the functions of the product, and fall afoul of the rule that a patentee
may not broaden his claims by describing the product in terms of function”); Holland
Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–58 (1928) (the Court struggled
with the issue of functional claims in relation to the limitations of the invention); see
also Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 318 (“A process
and an apparatus by which it is performed are distinct things. They may be found in
one patent; they may be made the subject matter of different patents.”); Rubber Co.
v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788 (1869) (processes as well as products that result are independently patentable subject to novelty).
62. Exxon Rsch. & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing United Carbon and noting that the standard for definiteness is “easy to
state” but “not always [] easy to apply”).
63. See also Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1882). There, the Court took
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different courts indicate that the perspective on factors like commercial success may have indirectly impacted the decision.64 Similarly, in
United Carbon, the Court noted that the success associated with the
patentees’ process for making the patented product was short-lived.65
The inference being that the patent grant would exceed the usefulness
of the invention.
III. THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The subjective assessment of definiteness, which continued for
decades following United Carbon, is misplaced in the 4IR. Since the
time the Supreme Court decided United Carbon, consumer adoption
of new technologies hastened.66 It took 75 years for one-hundred million users to adopt the telephone.67 By the eve of the 4IR,68 it took two
years for one-hundred million users to adopt Instagram.69 Today,
notice of numerous meetings between the inventor and the accused infringer
smacked of inequity, seemingly supporting a more lenient view of the disclosure
requirements for purposes of enablement.
64. See, e.g., Mins. Separation v. Hyde, 207 F. 956, 959 (D. Mont. 1913) (“Its
successful operations, practically from discovery, have recovered, and largely from
waste and tailings, values aggregating near $9,000,000, and at a profit of near
$4,000,000 to the patent owner and its licensees.”); Hyde v. Mins. Separation, 214
F. 100, 107–08 (noting that the district court had emphasized “extensive and successful use” but in the U.S. the accused infringer only invested $60,187); Mins. Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 269–70 (referencing that the invention came into use
worldwide).
65. At a high level there appears to be a correlation. However, the courts did not
expressly link these extraneous facts to their assessment of the definiteness requirement.
66. Rita Gunther McGrath, The Pace of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (Nov. 25, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/the-pace-of-technology-adoption-is-speeding-up [https://perma.cc/4YC2-ELXV].
67. Skye Gould, It Took 75 Years for the Telephone to Reach 100 Million Users
. . . And It Took Candy Crush Saga 15 Months, BUS. INSIDER (July 28, 2015, 10:37
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/it-took-75-years-for-the-telephone-to-reach
-100-million-users-and-it-took-candy-crush-15-months [https://perma.cc/Y98H-7Q
SM]. Instagram is a tool used to distribute photographs. The length of time to adopt
the telephone related to economic factors such as discretionary income. However,
today consumers have greater access to technology. That serves to increase the rate
of adoption and change.
68. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to
Respond, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-howto-respond/ [https://perma.cc/26Q6-UAAV] (concluding that the current state of
technology is “blurring the lines between physical, digital and biological spheres”).
69. Francis Bea, What User Backlash? Instagram Now Has 100 Million Users,
DIGITALTRENDS (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/instagram-100-million-users [https://perma.cc/YBD5-MBB6] (“Instagram
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industrial leaders know that slow development time equates to losing
market share in both existing and emerging markets. At stake is unprecedented revenue in technology sectors, such as biotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, communications, and energy storage to
name a few. Unlike the siloed and slowly developed innovation of the
twentieth century, innovation is now developed at a breakneck pace.70
Computerized tools, ICT, and the IoT make this phenomenon possible.
It also is the root cause of convergence, which in turn creates challenges to satisfying the definiteness requirement.
A. Convergence Illustrated
Just a few years prior to the Court’s decision in Minerals Separation, a Swiss-born immigrant named Albert Butz was inventing technology for regulating temperature. He has been recognized as “the father of modern automated control.”71 One of his 13 patented
inventions is entitled the Electric Damper-Regulator (“Butz patent”).72
The commercial application of his inventions largely related to regulating the temperature of a coal-fired furnace.73 Claim one of the Butz
patent recites components including “a shaft, an electric motor which
moves the shaft, an electric brush connected to the shaft and moved
thereby, a thermostat in the main circuit, electric generators in the auxiliary circuit . . . [and] a switch between the circuits, to cut out the main
circuit containing the thermostat . . . .” 74 These individual components
were publicly used on electric trains to transport people as early as
1888.75 It illustrates a limited degree of the convergence of mechanical
announced it reach 100 million users, just two and a half years since its launch.”).
Notably, Instagram does not take the place of a cellphone. However, in a general
sense, a picture conveys a thousand words.
70. See George Stalk, Jr., Time–The Next Source of Competitive Advantage,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (July 1988), https://hbr.org/1988/07/time-the-next-source-ofcompetitive-advantage [https://perma.cc/YBM3-68M3]; see also Klaus Schwab,
The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond, WORLD ECON.
F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrialrevolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/
[https://perma.cc/WB9B-B7YX].
71. See Albert Butz, IMMIGRANT LEARNING CTR. (June 2021), https://www.ilctr.
org/entrepreneur-hof/albert-butz/ [https://perma.cc/2DVX-QQX2].
72. Electric Damper Regulator (“Butz patent”), U.S. Patent No. 736,490 (filed
Feb. 24, 1902) (issued Aug. 18, 1903).
73. Albert Butz, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Butz
[https://perma.cc/VDR9-9WT6] (referring to the patented invention as a “damper
flapper”).
74. ’490 Patent.
75. Michael Robbins, The Early Years of Electric Traction: Invention,
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and electrical technologies. Like those in United Carbon and Minerals
Separation, the elements of this era were familiar and the corresponding subject-matter comprehendible to the educated layperson.
The company Butz founded, the Butz Thermo-electric Regulator
Co., was one of many predecessors to the multibillion dollar conglomerate we know today as Honeywell International (“Honeywell”).76 Despite the passage of time, Honeywell products include components
that function on the principles disclosed in the Butz patents. U.S. Patent No. 10,541,556 (“Honeywell patent”) confirms this observation.77
Like the Butz patent, the Honeywell patent is directed to controlling
and operating devices for remotely regulating energy in buildings,
which include temperature control.78 The specification illustrates, and
the claims recite, components that are comprehendible to an educated
layperson, e.g., an electricity meter, visual alerts, software, etc. However, the Honeywell patent application also includes various convergent technologies that muddy familiar definiteness waters, such as
web application (enterprise demand manager or “EDM”), a universal
demand response gateway (“UDG”), a cloud application, demand response (“DR”) automation servers (“DRAS’s”), amongst others.79
These acronyms are recited in every claim of the Honeywell patent.80
A high-level examination of the Honeywell patent reflects the
problematic nature of claiming 4IR-convergent technology. First, 4IRconvergent claim limitations, such as EDM, may not meet the standard
for definiteness. Presumably, EDM is customized, application-specific software. The same is true of the UDG. Disclosing of the software
programs is not feasible. Second, these elements are fertile ground for
those of skill in the art to disagree on definiteness. Third, how does a
judge determine whether elements like the EDM are disclosed with
Development, Exploitation, 21 J. OF TRANSP. HIST. 92, 96 (2000).
76. Albert Butz, IMMIGRANT LEARNING CTR. (June 2021), https://www.ilctr.org
/entrepreneur-hof/albert-butz/ [https://perma.cc/2DVX-QQX2].
77. See U.S. Patent No. 736,490 (filed Feb. 24, 1902); U.S. Patent No.
10,541,556 B2 (filed Apr. 27, 2017).
78. ’556 Patent.
79. Id.
80. Patents including convergent technologies do not invariably represent an unbridled amount of technological diversity. However, the European Patent Office reported that patent applications relating to one or two technology fields have fallen
from 80 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 2016. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, PATENTS
AND THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 40 (2017). From 2013 to 2016, the European Patent Office also reported that the growth rate of 4IR patent applications
increased by 54 percent. Id. at 11. In the same period, patent applications in general
increased by 7.65 percent. Id.; see, e.g., Cryptocurrency System Using Body Activity Data, WIPO Patent No. PCT/US2019/038084 (filed June 20, 2019).
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reasonable certainty? Unlike the Butz patent, the Honeywell patent involves a wide array of technological disciplines. For example, an
EDM versus an electric motor. The subjective and visceral assessment
of definiteness, as gleaned from United Carbon and Minerals Separation, may be misplaced in 4IR.
B. Miles Laboratories v. Shandon Inc.
Miles Laboratories v. Shandon Inc. reflects the calculous associated with the definiteness requirement for claims covering convergent
technologies.81 The patents-in-suit involve automated methods and an
apparatus for processing tissue specimens for microscopy.82 The ’460
patent disclosure at Figure 2 illustrates the convergence of chemistry,
fluid mechanics, biology, electronics, and thermodynamics.83

Claim 1 includes terms such as “tissue processing solution,” “uniform tissue receptacle,” “a temperature controlled and electrically
81. 997 F.2d 870, 874–75 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
82. Id. at 877; U.S. Patent No. 4,001,460 (filed Mar. 5, 1975); U.S. Patent No.
29,073 (filed Aug. 5, 1975) (reissued Dec. 14, 1976).
83. ’460 Patent fig.2.
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heated processing chamber,” and “pressure sealable top cover”
amongst other limitations.84 While the district court’s findings on validity and infringement were affirmed, the Federal Circuit noted that
the district court incorrectly characterized the “validity challenge as a
claim definiteness issue.”85 The Federal Circuit also stated that the appellant’s arguments were “possibly relevant . . . to the enablement requirement [] or to utility.”86
C. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,87 one of the patentsin-suit, the ’195 patent,88 concerns the utilization of recombinant DNA
to manufacture a therapeutic agent, purified erythropoietin (“EPO”).89
Conventional EPO isolation techniques did not result in significant
purification. It was impracticable to mass produce EPO from natural
sources like human urine.90 The patented invention paved the way for
mass production, regardless of whether the EPO purified originates
from natural sources or is a bioproduct of genetic engineering.91
The ’195 claims in question involve “homogeneous erythropoietin” and “[a] pharmaceutical compound to treat anemia.”92 The parties did not dispute the claim construction of these terms. The indefiniteness issue revolved around a measurement of specific activity that
is useful in quantifying the purification process. During prosecution,
the examiner rejected claims directed to a specific activity of “at least
120,000 IU/AU”93 over close prior art having a specific activity of
84. ’460 cols. 10–11.
85. Miles Labs., Inc, 997 F.2d at 875.
86. Id.
87. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
88. U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 195 cols. 8–9 (filed Jan. 11, 1985).
89. EPO is a hormone that can be used as a therapeutic agent to stimulate red
blood cell production. It is helpful for clinically treating anemia. Amgen, Inc., 927
F.2d at 1203. The district court noted that EPO is a complex, three-dimensional protein configuration consisting of 165 amino acids. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
No. 87-2617-Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16110, at *15–16 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 1990).
90. U.S. Patent No. 4,470,008 col. 1 (filed July 2, 1982).
91. Id. at col. 2 l. 45–68.
92. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,195 col. 8 l. 50–68 (filed Jun. 11, 1985).
93. “Potency of EPO in [one of the patents-in-suit] is stated as its specific activity, expressed as a ratio of International Units (which measures the ability of EPO to
cause formation of red blood cells) per absorbance unit (the amount of light absorbed
by a sample of EPO measured by a spectrophotometer at a given wavelength, 280
nanometers), i.e., IU/AU.” Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1215, n. 10.
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128,620 IU/AU. To distinguish the invention over the prior art, the
applicant responded by amending the specific activity limitation to “at
least about 160,000 IU/AU,” which the examiner subsequently allowed.94
Specific activity of EPO produced in vivo, i.e., produced by genetic engineering, is measured using bioassays.95 Expert testimony
persuaded the district court that bioassays “provide an imprecise form
of measurement with a range of error.”96 Thus, use of bioassays
“served to neither distinguish the invention over the close prior art of
120,000 IU/AU, nor to permit one to know what specific activity values below 160,000, if any, might constitute infringement.”97 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of indefiniteness but
added a caveat noting that the indefiniteness finding was limited in
scope.98 More accurately, it was inconsequential.
D. North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.
North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,99 decided three years later, also involved complex subject matter. The patent-in-suit is directed to a vaccine that boosts human infants’ immune
system against life threatening bacterial infections, such as meningitis.100 The only independent claim includes the limitation “linkage to
a termination portion of the polysaccharide without significant crosslinking.”101
The district court noted that a polysaccharide can be crudely conceptualized as a string in that it has two ends.102 As such, there are
94. Id. at 1217–18.
95. Id. at 1216, 1218.
96. Id. at 1217.
97. Id.
98. “We also note that, in view of our reversal of the district court’s holding that
claims 1 and 3 are invalid [for lack of enablement], claims 4 and 6 [upon which they
depend] would also be invalid without the “about” limitation. In arriving at this conclusion, we caution that our holding that the term “about” renders indefinite claims
4 and 6 should not be understood as ruling out all uses of this term in patent claims.”
Id. at 1218. The comment serves to remind the patent community that claim language such as “about” is not per se indefinite. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“use of ‘stretching . . . at a
rate exceeding about 10% per second’ in the claims is not indefinite”).
99. 7 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100. U.S. Patent No. 4,356,170 (filed May 27, 1981).
101. Id. at col. 2 (emphasis added).
102. For purposes of immunization, the accused product, marketed as HibTITER,
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three potential interpretations concerning linkage to a polysaccharide.
The polysaccharide can be linked at one terminal end, called a monomer. There can be linkage at both ends of the polysaccharide, often
referred to as difunctional or a dimer. Both monomers and dimers
therefore exhibit end-to-end “crosslinking.”103 It is also possible to
link proteins along the backbone of the polysaccharide, called trimers.
The district court determined that, based on extrinsic evidence, Dr.
Jennings directed his invention to a monomer because it was a better
formulation for inoculation of children.104 Hence, the district court
concluded that the term “without significant crosslinking” is properly
construed as a monomer.105 Given the accused product was difunctional, the court ruled that there was no infringement.106
On the issue of definiteness, the district court took umbrage with
the number of polysaccharides that fell within the scope of the claims
as construed, many of which would yield varied results.107 Indeed, the
parties entered a stipulation to eliminate various categories of polysaccharides.108 Despite the parties’ agreement, the district court reasoned
adds a protein via chemical linkage at each end of this string. Thus, it was crucial to
defendant’s infringement case to urge upon the court that the language in claim 11
should mean literally what it says: that it is a claim in which there is linkage at one
terminal portion of the polysaccharide, not at both ends. The district court ruled from
the bench on the issues of claim construction and definiteness. The transcript reflects
the judge’s firm grasp of the underlying subject matter. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., No. 91 Civ. 1449, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13476, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 1992).
103. Id. at *12–13, 15, 20–26.
104. Id. at *7 (“Now, some of the work in this field involved methods which
placed a great deal of protein matter on the polysaccharide, that protein matter being
distributed all along the length of the polysaccharide. The problem with this was that
there was too little polysaccharide left exposed, and I think the evidence refers to
this problem as being that the immune system of the infant would not recognize the
polysaccharide. In any event, covering the polysaccharide with protein or having a
lot of protein along the length was a problem. As we know from the evidence in this
case, that which I have just called a problem perhaps was not perceived by everyone
as a problem, because certain parties developed products in which this situation occurred where there was protein distributed along the length of the polysaccharide.
But at least to some scientists it was viewed as a problem, and certainly it was viewed
as a problem by Dr. Jennings.”).
105. Id. at *19–21.
106. Id. at *24–26.
107. Id. at *8–9.
108. Id. at *21-22 (“It has been stipulated that if the [inventor’s] oxidation process
were applied to all of these serotypes of the five groups referred to in claim 12, some
would produce a monofunctional result. Some would produce a difunctional result.
Some would produce a polyfunctional result; that is, protein distributed all along the
polysaccharide…. And I think it is clear from the record that on some of these
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that the stipulation only served to highlight the issue of uncertainty in
claim scope.109 It held that the claims were indefinite.110 On appeal,
the majority affirmed the narrowest claim construction.111 However,
regarding the holding of indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit reversed.112 It relied on extrinsic evidence, namely testimony from the
accused infringer’s expert. The expert opined that in a hypothetical
laboratory, one of skill in the art could rule out various polysaccharides.113
E. Difficulties with Definiteness
Miles Laboratories, Amgen, and North American Vaccine raise
questions as to whether United Carbon and Minerals Separation are
obsolete, or at the very least, in need of rethinking. Miles Laboratories
illustrates that the district court understood the convergent technology
and correctly decided validity and infringement. However, it is evident
that the district court as well as the appellant confused definiteness
with other doctrines concerning claim scope.
In Amgen, the claim-related issues overshadowed the definiteness
inquiry. Without any accurate means to measure “at least about
160,000 IU/AU,” one of skill in the art could not practice the invention.114 Other claim terms also lacked enablement.115 Not surprisingly,
the Federal Circuit marginalized definiteness in favor of enablement.
serotypes, it is not known what would happen. In addition, it is stipulated that on
some of these serotypes which would not naturally and easily yield the monofunctional result, such a result could be obtained if there was pretreatment of the kind
taught at an earlier point in the patent.”).
109. Id. at *22.
110. Id. at *24.
111. On appeal, the majority affirmed the district court’s claim construction and
the finding of no infringement. Judge Rader dissented. In part, he disagreed with the
majority’s claim construction of “without significant cross-linking.” Judge Rader
believed that the majority’s construction of this term was unduly narrow. Judge
Rader set out a thorough, factual, and well-reasoned dissent showing that the claims
and intrinsic record support a broader claim scope, namely covering both monomers
and dimers. N. Am. Vaccine Inc., 7 F.3d at 1578, 1582–83 (Rader, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1580.
113. Id.
114. “[T]he inventor failed to provide a patent disclosure sufficient to enable one
skilled in the art to carry out the invention commensurate with the scope of the
claims.” Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 1217–18 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
115. Specifically, “homogeneous erythropoietin” or “[a] pharmaceutical compound to treat anemia” were not enabled. Id. at 1203.
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The Federal Circuit even added a caveat to limit the precedential value
of its indefiniteness holding.116
North American Vaccine demonstrated two problems. First, like
Miles Laboratories the parties and district court confused definiteness
and other claim-related doctrines, namely utility and enablement.117
Second, the court excluded extrinsic evidence in the form of the inventor’s articles for purposes of claim construction because “[p]atents
often teach embodiments not carried out in the laboratory.”118 However, the court allowed extrinsic evidence concerning hypothetical laboratory experiments for purposes of definiteness.119 It illustrates the
tension between claim interpretation and definiteness.
From these modern cases, it is questionable whether the old precedent can promote certainty and uniformity in 4IR, especially given
confusion with other claim-specific doctrines like enablement, claim
construction, and utility. It signaled the need for a new standard.

116. Id. at 1218.
117. The accused infringer contended “that claims 12 and 25 are invalid because
they do not really teach anything.” N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13476, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 1992). The district court agreed
for purposes of determining definiteness, but the argument is relevant to utility or
enablement. The Federal Circuit gratuitously added that neither theory was raised
on appeal. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc., 7 F.3d at 1579 (“The fact that dependent claims
include species which might not meet the objects of the invention does not by itself
prove that one skilled in the art cannot ascertain the scope of the asserted claims.
That objection goes to possible inoperativeness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or lack of
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, neither of which provisions are
before us.”).
118. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc., 7 F.3d at 1578. More specifically, the Federal Circuit
noted that the district court erred by using the inventor’s papers and speech to buttress its finding of a narrow claim scope. It deemed it harmless error given other
persuasive arguments. However, the district court also found that the claim term
“polysaccharide” applied to so many proteins that it rendered the claim scope indefinite. While the Federal Circuit agreed, it relied on the expert testimony concerning
hypothetical lab results to narrow the claim term “polysaccharide” for purposes of
holding that the patent was definite. Id.
119. In narrowing the scope of “polysaccharides” for purposes of reversing the
finding of indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit relied upon the patent holder’s expert
testimony about what he “think[s]” he can [probably] rule out in a hypothetical laboratory. Id. at 1580. The expert testified that “[i]t’s understood by everyone working in the field that you first draw out from [the group of bacterial types in claim 12]
the particular types that are relevant to infantile meningitis, and then I think, as a
scientist, I would look at the structure of the polysaccharides from those types and I
would say are they structures that would, when subjected to this process, leave a
backbone that’s antigenic and probably, therefore, effective as a vaccine. Id. (emphasis added).
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IV. EXXON: THE INSOLUBLY AMBIGUOUS STANDARD
A. The Technology and Procedural History
The procedural history in Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v.
United States120 presented an opportunity to rethink the standard for
definiteness. In Exxon, the patentee, Exxon Research, alleged that the
United States infringed two patents directed to improvements in the
Fischer-Tropsch process.121 This chemical process converts natural
gas into petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbon byproducts. The process relates to breaking down natural gas into a synthesis gas. The
synthesis gas is introduced into a “slurry bubble column reactor.”122 A
column in the reactor contains solid catalyst particles in liquid suspension. When the synthesis gas is introduced to the catalyst particles under carefully controlled conditions, the synthesis gas reacts with other
products to form liquid hydrocarbons. Exxon Research’s patented inventions are directed to solving problems that made the Fischer-Tropsch process impractical for widespread commercial use.123
The patents-in-suit, U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,292,705 (“’705 patent”) and
5,348,982 (“’982 patent”) are directed to improving the operation of a
slurry bubble column reactor.124 The ’705 patent teaches how to increase the productivity of the catalyst.125 The only independent claim
of the ’705 patent includes the claim limitation “period sufficient to
increase substantially the initial catalyst productivity.”126 The ’982
patent teaches how to optimize operation of the slurry bubble column.127 The only independent claim of the ’982 patent includes the
claim limitations “substantial absence of slug flow,” “fluidizing the . . .
catalyst particles . . . to height, H > 3m,” “particles of average diameter,” and the term “UL,” which relates to liquid velocity along the
slurry bubble column reactor.128
120. 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
121. Id. at 1373.
122. Id. at 1380.
123. Id. at 1377.
124. Id. at 1373.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1374.
127. Id.
128. Id. Suffice it say that the intrinsic record includes complicated engineeringrelated information including chemical reactions, equations, process variables, illustrations, etc.
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The trial court docketed a date for claim construction. In its claim
construction brief, the patent challenger “determined that it could not
propose a definition for certain terms because they were indefinite.”129
In response, Exxon asked the trial court to take the claim construction
hearing off the docket and instead proceed directly to trial on liability
issues, including claim construction, validity, and infringement. For
purposes of judicial economy,130 the trial court rejected Exxon’s proposal, postponed the claim construction hearing, and focused its attention on definiteness. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court
granted summary judgment that both patents were indefinite.131
The trial court and Federal Circuit alike acknowledged numerous
ambiguities in the patent disclosures. For example, different equations
lead to different results in relative catalyst productivity, thereby calling into question the claim term “increase substantially.”132 Likewise,
the specification did not expressly reference an upper or lower limit
associated with the claim term “for a period sufficient.”133 There are
no empirical boundaries for the term “substantial absence of slug
flow.”134 The parties contested whether there was one or two measurements for “H,” the height of the column.135 An upper limit for “particles of average diameter”136 is not specified in the specification.
B. A Construable Claim is Definite
While the law on definiteness remained unchanged since United
Carbon, in the years preceding Exxon, the tenants of claim construction evolved.137 Hence, Exxon is unique in that a decision on
129. Exxon Rsch. & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 278, 281 (2000).
130. The trial court reasoned that “indefiniteness should be considered separate
from claim construction on a motion for summary judgment . . . [I]f some claims
were held to be indefinite, there would be no reason to construe other claims about
which the issue of indefiniteness had not been raised.” Id.
131. Id. at 291, 302.
132. Exxon Rsch., 265 F.3 at 1377.
133. Id. at 1378. The Federal Circuit noted that a lower boundary was sufficient
to determine “for a period sufficient.” Id. It reasoned that the variations depend on
changes in the catalyst and process conditions which would be reasonably precise to
one of skill in the art considering the subject matter. Id. The lower limit could be
about 0.25 hours and preferably 0.5 hours. Id.
134. Id. at 1380.
135. Id. at 1381.
136. Id. at 1382.
137. For example, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, the Supreme Court held
that the trial judge, and not the jury, is best suited to determine the scope of patent
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definiteness was made without any findings on claim construction. At
the beginning and end of the opinion concerning indefiniteness, the
Federal Circuit in Exxon recited cases applying the “reasonable certainty” standard.138 However, in the middle, the Federal Circuit articulated a standard for definiteness using newly minted language:
If a claim is insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can be properly adopted, we have held the claim
indefinite. If the meaning of the claim is discernable, even
though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may
be one over which reasonable persons disagree, we have held
the claim to be sufficiently clear to 139
avoid invalidity to avoid
invalidity on indefiniteness ground.
Without saying as much, the Federal Circuit’s “insolubly ambiguous”
language inextricably linked claim construction and definiteness.140
The nexus between claim construction and validity in a broader sense
claims. 571 U.S. 370 (1996). Even though there was no question of definiteness in
Markman, the Court reiterated its own rationale in United Carbon, namely, to promote uniformity and avoid “zone[s] of uncertainty.” Id. at 388–90. Subsequently,
the Federal Circuit en banc ruled that claim construction is entirely free of factual
findings, hence, purely a question of law. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Supreme Court, in Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., overturned the Cybor line of cases and held that claim
construction may include findings of fact and that as such, they are reviewed on
appeal under the more deferential clearly erroneous standard. 574 U.S. 318 (2014).
See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner & Howard A. Kwon, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies:
The Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Construction?, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 481, 497 (1998) (“The Federal Circuit’s plenary authority
over the claim construction process may have harsh results in practice and may undermine the judicial role of the district courts in patent litigation.”).
138. Exxon Rsch., 265 F.3d at 1375–76, 1382.
139. Id. at 1375.
140. After seven years of applying the “insolubly ambiguous” standards, the Federal Circuit noted that “we have held claims indefinite where a claim recites meansplus-function elements without disclosing corresponding structure in the specification, Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
includes a numeric limitation without disclosing which of multiple methods of measuring that number should be used, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341
F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and contains a term that is ‘completely dependent
on a person’s subjective opinion.’ Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, 417 F.3d
1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We have also stated that a claim could be indefinite if
a term does not have proper antecedent basis where such basis is not otherwise present by implication, or the meaning is not reasonably ascertainable. Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The
common thread in all these cases is that claims were held indefinite only where a
person of ordinary skill in the art could not determine the bounds of the claims, i.e.,
the claims were insolubly ambiguous.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
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is not without legal support.141 In Smith v. Snow,142 the Supreme Court
held that “if the claim [is] fairly susceptible of two constructions, that
should be adopted which will secure to the patentee his actual invention.”143 Indeed, Smith was cited in Exxon. What appears to be a logical extension of Smith v. Snow, however, is not at all discernable from
Minerals Separation or Union Carbon.144
141. See Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (adopting the narrower claim construction to avoid invalidating the claim).
More specifically, the Federal Circuit held that a claim is indefinite when it is incapable of being construed, i.e., when it is “insolubly ambiguous.” See id. The Federal
Circuit explained that under its own precedent, a patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness “only when it is ‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous.’”
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005)). Under that standard, the Exxon court said that a claim is indefinite if it cannot
meaningfully be construed or “if reasonable efforts at claim construction result in a
definition that does not provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled
artisans of the bounds of the claim.” Id. at 898 (quoting Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
142. 294 U.S. 1 (1935).
143. See id. at 14 (in which the Court stated that “if the claim [is] fairly susceptible
of two constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to the patentee his
actual invention,” the Court narrowed the claim interpretation in order to avoid invalidating the claim (citing Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 144–45
(1894)); Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’s Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (rejecting indefiniteness argument after construing claims; stating that
“when claims are amenable to more than one construction, they should when reasonably possible be interpreted to preserve their validity”(citing ACS Hosp. Sys.,
Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); Athletic Alts., Inc.
v. Prince Mfg., Inc. 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (choosing the narrower of
two equally plausible claim constructions in order to avoid invalidating the claim);
cf. id. at 1583 (Nies, J., concurring) (“I do not agree that the adoption of the narrower
of two equally plausible interpretations should somehow flow from the requirement
of 112 ¶ 2. . . . The majority analysis is illogical to me. Narrowness cannot be
equated with definiteness.”).
144. Compare Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935), with Mins. Separation v. Hyde,
242 U.S. 261 (1916), and United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228
(1942). There are cases that evidenced that the two can remain distinct. For example,
in Pure Choice, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., there, the inquiry remained distinct.
333 F. App’x 544, 548–549 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential decision). However,
upon closer examination, it appears that was the result of the parties’ litigation-related decisions. Id. at 546. In Honeywell, the claim at issue related to an air quality
monitoring system. Id. Claim one recited the following limitations: An air quality
monitoring system comprising: a data acquisition system for collecting air quality
data at a data acquisition site, said data acquisition system including: at least one
sensor for measuring environmental air quality data; Id. at 545–46. The district court
construed the claim “air quality data” as a “concentration of pollutants or contamina[nts] in the air.” Id. at 54–47. The district court concluded that the reissued claim
as construed was “insolubly ambiguous.” Id. at 547. The Federal Circuit affirmed
both the district court’s claim construction and the finding of indefiniteness. Id. at
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V. NAUTILUS: THE SUPREME COURT OVERTURNS EXXON
A. Returning Definiteness to 1870
Thirteen years after Exxon, the Federal Circuit applied the “insolubly ambiguous” standard and overturned a summary judgment decision that found the patent in question to be indefinite. Subsequently,
the Supreme Court granted the patent challenger’s petition for writ of
certiorari. Unlike Exxon, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc.,145 the invention disclosed in the patent-in-suit is simple: a handle
on exercise equipment having electrodes connected to garden-variety
circuitry and a heart-rate monitor.146
The handle, i.e., an “elongate member,” is arranged so that each
hand of the user contacts a “live electrode” and a “common electrode.”
Figure 1 of the patent-in-suit illustrates the “elongate member.” The
electrodes are connected to well-known circuitry that conditions the
electric signals for subsequent processing by a heart rate monitor. The
purpose of this arrangement is intended to improve the accuracy of
measuring electrocardiograph (“ECG,” also referred to as “EKG”) signals associated with the electroactivity of the heart. It does so by electronically attenuating unwanted noise associated with electromyogram signals (“EMG”), which emanates from muscles.147
The district court was troubled by specific details corresponding
to the recited elements148 that were not disclosed in the intrinsic
548–49. The parties did not ask the court to construe terms such as “environmental
air quality data” or “non-weather data.” See generally id. Based on the intrinsic record and the claim construction that followed, these terms are incapable of construction. Id. at 545. The claim as issued recited only one “sensor” and it was used “for
measuring air quality data.” Id. at 546. During reexamination, the claim was
amended to include two sensors, one for measuring “environmental air quality data”
and the other “non-weather data.” Id. However, the term environmental data was
disavowed prior to reexamination to the extent it extended beyond the term air quality data as construed. Id. There was no definition of “environmental” or “nonweather data” in the written description to support the claim allowed during reexamination. Id. Further, the applicant did not summarize its interview with the examiner to reflect the basis for including variables into the reexamined claim, thereby
circumnavigating 37 C.F.R. § 1.560(b). Id. at 549. This case demonstrates that while
the claim construction and definiteness can remain separate, it is unlikely. See generally id.
145. 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
146. U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 (filed June 9, 1992).
147. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 898.
148. The only independent claim in the ’753 patent recites in part an “elongate
member” having two halves, with “a first live electrode and a first common electrode
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record. For example, the composition of the handle was unspecified.
The electrodes could be placed “between two middle fingers, the outer
first and fourth finger, the thumb underneath and fingers on
top . . . .”149 The users’ hands could be small or large, thereby potentially affecting the scope of the “spaced relationship” claim term. The
district court noted that it
found nothing in evidence that provided how a skilled artisan
would have determined the appropriate parameters yielding
the necessary ‘spaced relationship’ as recited by the ‘753 patent: what [the expert] says is that through trial and error,
which he doesn’t describe, one can find a spaced relationship. That may be. But there’s no description.150
The district court construed the claim term “spaced relationship” to
mean that “there is a defined relationship between the live electrode
and the common electrode on one side of the cylindrical bar and the
same or a different defined relationship between the live electrode and
the common electrode on the other side of the cylindrical bar.”151 The
district court granted Nautilus’s motion for summary judgment. It
opined that the claim limitation “spaced relationship” was indefinite.152
B. Absolute Precision and Malevolence
In overturning Exxon’s standard for determining definiteness, the
Court stated that the Federal Circuit’s “insolubly ambiguous” standard
placed the judge in a difficult position153 of seeking “absolute precision.”154 The Supreme Court also opined that patent applicants would
mounted on said first half in a spaced relationship with each other” and “a second
live electrode and second common electrode on said second half in a spaced relationship with each other.” ’753 Patent, col. 5 ll. 17–36.
149. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 901 (2013).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 899.
152. Id.
153. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911 (2014) (noting
that the Federal Circuit’s standard for indefiniteness “can breed lower court confusion . . . .”).
154. In 1922, Albert Einstein noted “[i]t is mathematics which affords the exact
natural sciences a certain measure of security, to which without mathematics they
could not attain.” Albert Einstein, Geometry and Experience, MACTUTOR (last updated Apr. 2007), https://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Extras/Einstein_geometry/
[https://perma.cc/62B4-A6E3]. Einstein was a former clerk in the Swiss patent office
and inventor of fifty patents. The quote was not directed to patent law. However, the
observation undermines the role of reasonable certainty. In practice, Exxon did not
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succumb to “powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into the [patent]
claims.”155 The Supreme Court revived the reasonable certainty standard articulated in Minerals Separation and United Carbon. In so doing, the Court dialed the definiteness requirement back to the previous
century. The chart below illustrates the judicial standards used for assessing definiteness since the Patent Act of 1870 codified the requirement.

Evolution of Definiteness Standards in Court
1870 to 2002

2002 to 2014

Supreme Court

2014 – Present
Supreme Court

Regional Circuits (pre-1982)
Federal Circuit (1982-2002)

Federal Circuit (post-2002)

Federal Circuit

District Court

District Court

District Court

The Supreme Court stressed certainty in
light of the patented subject-matter,
e.g., “clear-cut claims" to avoid "zone[s]
of uncertainty."

Generally, if a claim can be construed,
i.e., not “insolubly ambiguous,” then it
is definite.

There must be "reasonable certainty“ as
to scope of the invention. Evidentiary
standards and doctrinal interrelationship
with claim construction is unclear.

Minerals Separation v. Hyde
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.

Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.
Teva Pharaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

require district courts to seek “absolute precision.” The standard required nothing
beyond applying the modern cannons of claim construction, which requires no more
precision than that gleaned from the intrinsic record. In fact, one can credibly argue
that claim construction requires “absolute precision.” For that reason, the Court’s
reasoning is questionable.
155. Nautilus, Inc., 572 U.S. at 910. The dreaded injection, “spaced relationship,”
is hardly the calling card of the dastardly Professor Moriarty. Design arounds, commensurate licenses, anticipation, obviousness, enablement, and claim interpretation
are well-known antidotes. A critical clue is the entity that recited this imagery—an
“amicus” tech giant. Distinguished patent colleagues aptly noted that “[t]ech
[g]iants, anxious to stave off competition, have worked tirelessly, under the guise of
‘reform,’ to undermine the value of U.S. Patents.” Paul R. Michel & Matthew J.
Dowd, America’s Innovators Need Clear Patent Laws, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-innovators-need-clear-patent-laws11579824646 [https://perma.cc/P2DE-X8JU]. As early as the 90’s, tech giants also
insisted on stringent “price caps” for the outside counsel that drafted patent applications. Their “powerful incentives” include reducing legal costs and gaining status
via highly publicized rankings based on superficial annual metrics. The purpose of
the patent system is undermined by tech giants seeking to boost numbers by filing
inexpensive, low quality patent applications directed to trivial technological features.
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Upon remand, the Federal Circuit for a second time reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment, reaffirming its prior holding.156 The case was remanded for further proceedings. The Federal
Circuit noted that the “[Supreme] Court has accordingly modified the
standard by which lower courts examine allegedly ambiguous claims:
we may now steer by the bright star of ‘reasonable certainty,’ rather
than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity.’”157 At the present time and for the foreseeable future, the patent community will
navigate the Supreme Court’s definiteness standard using the “bright
star” of Nautilus.
VI. CONCERNS WITH NAUTILUS
Justice Ginsburg158 authored the Nautilus opinion. The claimed invention is a simple, relatively siloed technology. As a result, the application of United Carbon is logical. The decision was unanimous,
but none of the justices had appreciable education or experience
156. See Biosig Instruments, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
157. Id. at 1379. The Federal Circuit’s sarcasm was as much as anything rooted
in the Supreme Court’s on-going assault of Federal Circuit precedent. See Lawrence
Hurley, For U.S. High Court, A Year of Discontent With Patent Rulings, REUTERS
(June 19, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-ip-analysis/for-u-shigh-court-a-year-of-discontent-with-patent-rulings-idUSKBN0EU2SV20140619
[https://perma.cc/DC5M-HPS8]. See also, Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
135 S.Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (in an appeal concerning the appropriate appellate standard used for factual findings on claim construction, the Supreme Court was uncharacteristically blunt, stating that “the Federal Circuit was wrong”). There is no denying that the judges of the Federal Circuit are highly experienced with modern
technology, certainly more so than the “elongate member” in Biosig Instruments’
U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753. The Court has technical advisors available as needed,
and exclusively handles appeals from the patent office, ITC, and federal courts. Indeed, in the Exxon case, the Federal Circuit noted that it “engages in claim construction “every day.” Exxon Rsch. & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2001).The Federal Circuit also readily appreciates the realities associated
with patent practice. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, over five hundred patents were invalidated
in a matter of five years. 573 U.S. 208 (2014). See Mark A. Lemley & Samantha
Zyontz, Does Alice Target Patent Trolls? 18 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (2021).
158. Upon her passing, Chief Justice John Roberts said “[t]oday we mourn but
with confidence that future generations will remember Ruth Bader Ginsburg as we
knew her, a tireless and resolute champion of justice.” Among many historic accomplishments, Justice Ginsburg is often credited for her contributions to gender equality. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549 (1996) (“[E]stimates of
what is appropriate for most women . . . no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description. Notably, Virginia never asserted that VMI’s method of education suits most men.”) (emphasis original).

2022]

BRIGHT STARS OR UNRELIABLE COMPASSES

391

concerning complicated technologies. The Supreme Court tends to
give deference to old precedent,159 which may be a weak foundation
for technology-dependent doctrines in the 4IR.
A. The 4IR Ecosystem
The business realities of the 4IR include greater competition, limited funding, the increasing pace of innovation, and rapid consumer
adoption. From the perspective of business leaders, the time to market
is more important than filing patents. Likewise, since as early as 1990,
a multitude of large tech companies “capped” the prices for preparing
and prosecuting patent applications.160 By doing so, they “commoditized” patent preparation and prosecution.161 Emerging enterprises,
which cannot benefit from economies of scale, often relegate patent
protection to the bottom of the proverbial “to do” list because of budgetary constraints.
The development of the CMOS image sensor162 (“CMOS sensor”)
is illustrative of how patenting is a small part of a bigger process. It
also demonstrates how the reasoning of Nautilus is philosophical but
not realistic. The CMOS sensor makes possible the miniaturization of
a camera. The first commercially viable CMOS sensor was invented
at the California Institute of Technology’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(“JPL”). The priority document of this revolutionary invention was a
provisional patent application163 (“provisional”) consisting entirely of
the inventors’ scientific publications. Filing the provisional patent in
159. In a decision involving the first sale doctrine, which is not technology-dependent, the Supreme Court noted Lord Coke’s decision on restraints of alienation
for real property. Lord Coke served as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1613.
Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526, 1538 (2017) (Lord
Coke’s reasoning concerned the unenforceability of restraints on the alienation of
property) (Justice Ginsburg dissenting because “a sale abroad [for purposes of patent
exhaustion] operates independently of the U.S. patent system . . . .”).
160. See generally Gene Quinn, Saving Money by Slashing Patent Attorney Fees
Wastes Every Dollar, (May 29, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/29/
saving-money-slashing-patent-attorney-fees/id=97877/
[https://perma.cc/6J8P-4596].
161. Id.
162. Active Pixel Sensor with Intra-Pixel Charge Transfer, U.S. Patent No.
5,471,515 (filed Jan. 28, 1994) (issued Nov. 28, 1995).
163. See Chinsammy v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 21, 25 (2010), aff’d 417 Fed.
Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A provisional patent application is not actually examined by the patent office but serves to establish a priority date if the inventor subsequently files the standard, non-provisional patent application.”).
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this manner was an “eleventh hour” stopgap measure to avoid a bar on
patentability resulting from the inventors’ own publications. In the patent application that followed, the claims as filed did not recite the
point of novelty, an “active pixel sensor.”164 The examiner subsequently allowed the defective, technically broadened, claims. As is
more often the case, there was no malevolent injection of ambiguity.
The market realities of the 4IR were to blame. Yet, competition was
not stymied. A technology license on the patent applications secured
the monetary resources necessary to commercialize the CMOS sensor
technology. In the first three quarters of 2019, 24 years after the patent
issued, the Sony subsidiary that manufactures CMOS sensors recorded
the highest operating profit among any Sony division.165 Today there
are CMOS sensors in manufacturing, security, medical equipment, automobiles, cellphones, airplanes, and satellites.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, development timelines were long, the technologies were siloed, and the market was slow
to adopt new technologies.166 The syntax associated with claim drafting was evolving. For example, United Carbon and GE Co. v. Wabash
Appliance Co.167 addressed the issue of using functional claim language. Functional claims are unduly broad. Yet, Nautilus adopted the
reasoning without accounting for historical context. “Reasonable certainty” of patent claims will reduce certainty and uniformity as technology increases in complexity and converges. Determining the
164. U.S. Patent No. 11/818453 (filed June 14, 2007).
165. River Davis, It’s All Smiles at Sony as Smartphone Cameras Boost Demand
for Its Image Sensors, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/its-all-smiles-at-sony-as-smartphone-cameras-boost-demand-for-itsimage-sensors-11580817679 [https://perma.cc/FS57-DQHQ].
166. See Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881) (explaining that patented improvements to looms for weaving fabric took approximately ten years to develop).
167. See GE Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co, 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938) (“the claim
uses indeterminate adjectives which describe the function of the grains to the exclusion of any structural definition.”); United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co. 317
U.S. 228, 234 (1942) (“the claims are but inaccurate suggestions of the functions of
the product and fall afoul of the rule that a patentee may not broaden his claims by
describing the product in terms of function.”). Cases concerning functional language
have been a recurred theme. However, it later mainly a question of claim construction. For example, with regards to drafting claims in a means-plus-function claim
format. Judge Rich, one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 stated that “if you
adopt this practice [of claim drafting], that element or step is construed – shall be
construed (it is mandatory) – to cover the corresponding structure, material or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” See also Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc. 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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reasonable certainty of claims directed to carbon black are not the
equivalent of those directed to the conversion of waste coal into green
biofuels.168 Comparing disclosures reflects an entirely different patent
drafting challenge. As a result, Nautilus is increasingly impractical as
the industry pushes deeper into the 4IR.
B. Claim Construction and Definiteness
Under Exxon, definiteness was self-evident once the claims were
construed pursuant to the modern tenants of claim construction. Nautilus inherently isolated definiteness and claim construction. Yet, the
Supreme Court failed to affirmatively set out how the two interrelate.
In other words, it is unclear where claim construction ends, the definiteness inquiry begins, and the evidentiary interplay of the two doctrines. As discussed above, the trial court in Exxon found the claims
indefinite prior to, and hence independent of, claim construction.
Even if a district court adopts the often-used approach of procedurally pairing indefiniteness with claim construction, there are still
open substantive questions as to the interplay of the doctrines.169 For
example, consider a case where the judge is assessing a claim construction that varies significantly from the parties’ proposed constructions. How does that impact the judge’s assessment of indefiniteness,
if at all?170 When the claims are ambiguous and extrinsic evidence
constitute substantive evidence on all issues relevant to claim scope,
the demarcation between claim construction and definiteness inquiries
is less clear. The high reversal rate of claim construction decisions171
168. See, e.g., Methods and Systems for Biological Coal-to-Biofuels and Bioproducts, U.S. Patent No. 10,557,155 B2 (issued Feb. 11, 2020).
169. See Phillips v. AWS Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ . . . That principle has been recognized since at least 1836, when Congress first required that the specification include a portion in which the inventor ‘shall particularly specify and point out the
part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.’ In the following years, the Supreme Court made clear that the claims are ‘of
primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented.’”
(citation omitted)).
170. Federal Circuit precedent reflects an orderly procedural approach. First, the
claims are construed. Second, indefiniteness is evaluated. However, issues such as
how to the standards of appeal review or linking testimony of skilled artisans on
extrinsic evidence and overlapping issues of claim scope are not clearly charted.
171. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005). Prior to
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may compound the issue. For example, it is possible that on appeal,
the record on definiteness was intertwined with an errant claim construction.172
C. Extrinsic Evidence
Another problem is the nexus between claim construction and definiteness. For example, for purposes of claim construction, there are
seminal cases that limit the role of extrinsic evidence, such as Markman, Cybor, and Phillips. These cases pre-date Nautilus. The en banc
Federal Circuit in Phillips recited four reasons why district courts
should use sound discretion concerning the use of extrinsic evidence.173 First, extrinsic evidence is not part of the patent and may not
be co-extensive with the intrinsic record for purposes of assessing the
patent’s scope. Second, extrinsic publications may not reflect the understanding of those of skill in the art in the patented subject matter.
Third, extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony is generated
at the time of and for the purposes of litigation. Thus, it may suffer
from bias or otherwise not be consistent with the intrinsic record.
Fourth, given the wealth of extrinsic evidence having marginal relevance to patented subject matter, litigants are likely to weave together
pieces of extrinsic evidence to support its arguments. The Federal Circuit in Phillips expressly stated that extrinsic evidence for purposes of
determining claim scope is “unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent scope.”174 Yet, the Supreme Court in Nautilus was silent
appointment to the bench, Judge Moore noted that from 1996 through 2003, the Federal Circuit reversed thirty-four percent of the claim constructions it reviewed. This
statistic should be weighed considering the average rate of reversals in civil cases in
Federal Courts which averaged roughly 12 percent at that time. See Table 3.1—U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S. CTS.,
(Sept. 30, 2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/31/judicial-facts-and-figures/2005/09/30 [https://perma.cc/UV8T-988J].
172. See Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 784 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the decision on definiteness was remanded for further
proceedings because the record below was based on an errant claim construction. In
Teva Pharmeceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding on definiteness. 789 F.3d 1335, (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the dissent pointed out, because the “insolubly ambiguous” test was good law at the time
of the district court’s determination, the majority should have remanded the case for
further proceedings to establish a record on definiteness. Id. at 1349. Because applying the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, there could not possibly be evidence, and
thus adequate briefing, on definiteness. Id.
173. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
174. Id. at 1319.
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on how this same evidence should be used for purposes of assessing
definiteness. For example, articles prohibited for purposes of claim
construction might be cobbled together for purposes of supporting definiteness.
The most glaring issue relates to the experts. For claim construction, the concept of expert assistance can trace its history to at least as
early as 1895.175 The expert acted in the capacity of an amicus. The
role of expert testimony, i.e., testimony of the skilled artisan, as it relates to claim construction was qualified by the Supreme Court in
Markman:
The decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert’s
proposed definition fully comports with the specification and
claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal coherence.
We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that
we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.176
Almost a decade later, the en banc Federal Circuit in Phillips noted
that “the inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin
claim interpretation.”177 On the use of expert testimony, the Federal
Circuit warned that “expert reports and testimony is generated at the
time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias
that is not present in the intrinsic record.”178
In 1894, Justice Brewer authored an article in which he raised several concerns regarding patent litigation.179 One was the use of experts.
He noted:
175. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 387 (1996) (quoting
A. Walker, Patent Laws § 75, p. 68 (3d ed. 1895). Prophetically, Walker noted that
“[q]uestions of construction are questions of law for the judge, not questions of fact
for the jury. As it cannot be expected, however, that judges will always possess the
requisite knowledge of the meaning of the terms of art or science used in letters
patent, it often becomes necessary that they should avail themselves of the light furnished by experts relevant to the significance of such words and phrases. The judges
are not, however, obliged to blindly follow such testimony.”).
176. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (1996).
177. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
178. Id. at 1318.
179. D. J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 155–56 (1894). It is remarkable, if not troubling, that many of Justice Brewer’s concerns from the nineteenth century exist in the U.S. patent system today.
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Every lawyer interviews, as he ought, his witnesses, that he
may have to interview many before he finds [one] with the
skill of an expert who looks upon the relations of things in a
light favorable to his case, and that so you read the testimony
of the patent expert on one side that there is patentability and
infringement, of the one on the other side that there is neither.180
Justice Brewer also attributed the following quote to Justice Miller:
“You don’t expect me to pay much attention to the testimony of witnesses who swear for either side at $50 a day?”181
The Supreme Court expressed the need to avoid “zones of uncertainty” on claim construction (Markman) and subsequently on definiteness (Nautilus).182 Yet, the expert is an amicus for claim construction but afforded substantive weight for definiteness. The attempt to
compartmentalize the same testimony bearing two different issues creates “zone[s] of uncertainty.”183
D. Obfuscation Compounded: Teva Pharmaceuticals
One year after Nautilus, the Supreme Court handed down Teva
Pharmaceuticals.184 Below, the district court construed the claim term
“molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodalton.”185 The intrinsic record
180. Id. This selection process may skew assumptions underlying reasonable certainty, e.g., in an instance where there exists a disproportionate number of skilled
artisans who embrace a particular opinion regarding definiteness.
181. Id. The Bureau of Labor Statistics only goes back to 1913. According to unofficial consumer price index calculators, Justice Miller’s biased expert in or around
1890 would cost roughly $1,422 a day in 2020. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR
https://www.officialdata.org/us/inflation/1890?endYear=2020&amount=50
[https://perma.cc/E3DG-ZRD9].
182. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Nautilus, Inc.
v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
183. Justice Brewer noted that experts can provide the judge with helpful information and most have good character and “complete scientific knowledge.” D. J.
Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 155–56 (1894). The Federal Circuit
also noted that experts can simplify the complexity of technological subject matter,
explain the relevance of the technological subject matter, and provide useful testimony about the accused product and prior art. See, e.g., Philips, 415 F.3d at 1318;
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir.
1999). In 4IR, the patent community will be well-served by more routine use of
neutral technical advisors.
184. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc,, 574 U.S. 318 (2014). The anticipated impact of Nautilus on claim construction is explored in Jason Rantanen,
Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REVIEW 430, 538
(2015).
185. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 810 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D.N.Y.
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included support for three interpretations. The extrinsic record included testimony from two experts having divergent views. The district court’s claim construction and definiteness determinations included findings of fact on the extrinsic evidence.
The district court construed the claims and, relying on Exxon, held
that the claims were definite.186 On appeal, the Federal Circuit afforded no deference to the district court’s factual findings on claim
construction, namely, those stemming from the testimony of the patentee’s expert.187 As the court reversed Exxon during the pendency of
the appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the “reasonable certainty”
standard definiteness of Nautilus and held that the claim limitation
“molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodalton” was indefinite.188 The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. The focus of the Supreme
Court’s decision was the Federal Circuit’s failure to give deference to
the district court’s factual findings on claim construction.189 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s long-standing and controversial precedent190 that claim construction was purely a question of
law.
On remand, the Federal Circuit tersely recited four findings of fact
concerning extrinsic evidence on claim construction. It found no clear
error and accordingly affirmed the district court’s claim construction.
In the same paragraph, the Federal Circuit inherently ignored the findings of fact for purposes of applying Nautilus. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding of definiteness. In his dissent, Judge
Mayer pointed out that there were no factual findings on definiteness
2011) The patents-in-suit are directed to a manufacturing method for Copaxone, a
drug for treating multiple sclerosis.
186. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 876 F. Supp 2d 295, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
187. Teva Pharms., 789 F.3d at 1339.
188. Id.
189. See Teva Pharms., 574 U.S. at 323; Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips
Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (the dissent
from the majority stated that “it is hard to understand how either the majority in
Cybor or the majority here can dispute that claim construction sometimes requires a
district court to resolve contested factual issues.”).
190. The dissent in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North
America, noted that “the majority of intellectual property lawyers and academics
around the country will no doubt be surprised by today’s majority opinion – and for
good reason.” It added that “[c]riticism of and debate over Cybor have been widespread since it issued – not only among legal scholars and patent practitioners, but
also among members of this court.” 744 F.3d at 1296.
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or corresponding briefing.191 It highlights the conflict. Given the ruling in Teva Pharmaceuticals, the district court’s factual findings on
definiteness should be afforded deference under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 52.
E. Practical Problems of Nautilus and Teva
Consider a simple, hypothetical patent directed to a novel visible
light emitter that includes the claim limitation “blue-green hue.” For
green light, the dominant wavelength192 is widely accepted as 550 nm.
In the hypothetical patent, the intrinsic record unequivocally discloses
an upper wavelength cutoff for “blue-green hue” corresponding with
the dominant wavelength of 550 nm. In contrast, the hypothetical intrinsic record bearing on the lower wavelength cutoff is ambiguous.
There is intrinsic support for wavelength cutoffs of 420 nm, 450 nm,
or 465 nm. The “dominant” wavelength for blue light is 450 nm. The
term “dominant wavelength” is not part of the intrinsic record, thereby
creating ambiguity. Hence, resort to extrinsic evidence is not barred
by applicable precedent on claim construction.

191. See Teva Pharms., 574 U.S. at 1345–49 (Mayer, J., dissenting). The district
court applied the Exxon standard which entirely turns on claim construction. Given
that “insolubly ambiguous” standard was overruled during the pendency of appeal,
Judge Mayer correctly reasoned that the case should be remanded for further proceedings on definiteness. In other words, the Federal Circuit applied extrinsic evidence for claim construction, ignored extrinsic evidence in evaluating definiteness.
North American Vaccine, which pre-dated Exxon, likewise, highlights this tension.
The Federal Circuit excluded extrinsic evidence on claim construction as unreliable.
It then relied on extrinsic evidence for deciding definiteness. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc.
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1580 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]s a scientist, I would
look at the structure of the polysaccharides from those types and I would say are
they structures that would, when subjected to this process, leave a backbone that’s
antigenic and probably, therefore, effective as a vaccine.”) (emphasis added). In
sum, the de novo standard for definiteness makes little sense given the Supreme
Court’s decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals.
192. The determination of “dominant wavelength” is well-known. See, e.g.,
LIQUID CRYSTALS APPLICATIONS AND USES, VOL. 2 51–53 (Birendra Bahadur ed.,
1991); HANDBOOK OF HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 583–84 (Martin G.
Helander et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1997).
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Assume Competitor Inc. seeks to assess the white space outside
the claims. Given the ambiguity in the lower frequency cutoff, the figure above represents three possible constructions of “blue-green hue.”
Under Exxon, the decision-makers at Competitor Inc. can rest assured
that the claims are definite: the claims can be construed. Similarly,
they can reasonably anticipate a narrow construction, “visible light
having a wavelength from 465 nm to 550 nm.” The black rectangle
above more likely than not “circumscribe[s] what is foreclosed from
future enterprise . . . .”193
Under Nautilus considering Teva, however, the analysis for purposes of white space is unclear. Pursuant to Teva, one or more skilled
artisans can be tasked with finding, reviewing, and relying on extrinsic
evidence for purposes of assessing white space. If those of skill in the
art agree on one possible construction, the corporate decision-makers
can rest assured as to claim scope. If there is divergence amongst the
skilled artisans, which is more likely than not, the decision-makers as
educated laypersons must rule out proposed constructions based on
factual underpinnings that they deem “clearly erroneous.” There may
be divergence amongst the decision-makers. Certainty is far less than
optimal.
Whether or not those involved agree on white space, Competitor
Inc. would be well-served in assessing definiteness. Nautilus sanctions
the use of extrinsic evidence on the issue of definiteness. The skilled
artisans are not bound to those used during claim construction. Assuming there is divergence in their findings, the decision-makers, the
skilled artisans, or perhaps both, must vote. Most of the votes answer
the legal question of definiteness. While turning to democracy on definiteness sounds odd, the methodology is not random. Definiteness
193. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236–37 (1942).
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remains a question of law and will be reviewed de novo on appeal. The
majority of any given panel resolves the issue.
VII. STATISTICAL IMPACT OF NAUTILUS194
In 2015, a Federal Circuit panel confirmed that “there can be no
serious question that Nautilus changed the law of definiteness.”195 Six
years later, there is a reasonable data set to evaluate the impact of that
change. Eliminating 2014,196 which was the year Nautilus was handed
down, definiteness challenges from 2008197 through 2020 were tallied.
Not surprisingly, definiteness challenges in the trial courts198

194. The numbers presented in this Section were tabulated as an approximation.
Precision is impracticable, perhaps not even useful, due to extraneous factors such
as unreported decisions, supplemental briefing, related claims and patent specifications, subsequent history, litigation tactics such as “kitchen sink” challenges, etc.
Indefiniteness cases arising from syntax-related fact patterns were excluded, such as
mixed apparatus and method claims. See, e.g., WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game
Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (functional claims for software algorithms);
IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (mixed
apparatus and method claims). Indefiniteness statistics from the patent office were
also excluded as the PTO applies a different standard for claim scope, i.e., the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (“BRI”). See, Ex parte McAward, No. 2015-006416,
2017 WL 3669566 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential opinion holding that in
ex partes prosecution, the BRI standard renders Nautilus inapplicable). There are
also no contrary indications that the BRI standard will be utilized in inter partes
review (“IPR”) proceedings in the Patent Office); See cf. Tinnus Enters., LLC v.
Telebrands Corp., 733 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We, thus await an appropriate case to resolve any apparent inconsistencies between the two indefiniteness
standards . . . .”). Further, definiteness issues before the PTAB are not a basis for
granting IPR petitions and are currently limited only to evaluating allowance of new
or amended claims as well.
195. Dow Chem. v. Nova Chems. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 630 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
196. It is difficult to determine how litigants and courts responded to Nautilus
following the decision. For example, Nautius may not have been applied where discovery has closed, trials were complete, motions, etc. Moreover, it is reasonable to
assume that the decision was not fully understood by litigants and courts.
197. The year 2008 was selected as the cutoff to provide a set of cases that are
generally include comparable precedent on claim construction.
198. “Trial Courts” include U.S. district courts, The Court of Federal Claims, and
the International Trade Commission (“ITC”).
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increased by 253%.199 Appeals200 of definiteness determinations increased by 95%.201 Despite the increases, the change in invalidity rates
pre-Nautilus versus post-Nautilus was not dramatic.202 At the trial
court level, the pre-Nautilus invalidity rate was 32.6%, while the postNautilus invalidity rate was 32.5%. There was a larger variance on
appeal. The pre-Nautilus invalidity rate was 20% versus the post-Nautilus rate of 36.4%.
Although the invalidity rate in trial courts has not changed appreciably, there are additional considerations. First, there is a case to be
199. The following charts reflect Nautilus challenges from 2008 through 2020:
Court

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Total

District
Court

7

9

6

2

11

7

—

42

ITC

0

0

0

0

1

0

—

1

Federal
Circuit

4

4

5

3

1

3

—

20

Court

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

District
Court

—

17

5

2

7

47

64

142

ITC

—

1

0

1

1

4

5

12

8

6

9

66

4

7

39

Federal
Circuit

200. “Appeals” only include those from “Trial Courts,” i.e., not the Patent and
Trademark Office.
201. See supra note 200 (chart).
202. Prior statistical pre-Nautilus studies are sparsely available. On appeal before
the Federal Circuit covering December 1998 through to December 2008, there seems
to be pre-Nautilus correlation, namely a 33 percent invalidity rate. See Christa Laser,
A Definite Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases
of the Past Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous
Standard, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 31 (2010). However, at the trial court
level, in a different article the authors examined indefiniteness cases from 1982 to
2012. See John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 612 (2016). The article reflects
a robust, detailed study of the statistics associated with Section 112 of the Patent
Act. The reported invalidity rate associated with indefiniteness reflects a large variance from that reported here, namely an invalidity rate of 18.2 percent. Id. at 645.
The differences may be attributable variances associated changes over time, such as
intervening precent or reporting sources, etc. A broader dataset for definiteness issues was also included, such that associated with mixed claiming.
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made that, given the increase in challenges, the rate should have
dropped.203 Consider other changes relating to patent invalidity, such
as Alice Corp.204 or the introduction of inter partes review (“IPR”). In
both instances, “success rates” dropped significantly as the number of
challenges increased. One year after the Supreme Court handed down
Alice, the invalidity rate was 69.7% in district courts and 94.1% at the
Federal Circuit.205 At the five-year mark, the cumulative invalidity
rate dropped to 53.7% in district courts and 76.3% at the Federal Circuit. A similar observation can be made regarding IPR institution
rates. After one year, the number of IPR institutions was 74.2%.206
After six years, the cumulative institution rate dropped to 63%.207
Based on these observations, one could expect the success rates of
Nautilus challenges to drop, especially given the sizeable increase in
challenges. That has not happened.
In most patent cases, the patents-in-suit lag innovation by several
years or more. Hence, as 4IR technology and convergent patents are
more frequently issued and litigated, the overall number of patents invalidated could increase with time, at least until the patent community
responds with more robust patent applications.

203. Aside from the higher bar associated with the definiteness standard, under
Exxon the patent challenger faced an advocacy dilemma. An accused infringer could
proffer a claim construction on a potentially indefinite claim. Alternately, the patent
challenged could forgo a proposed construction in favor of arguing that the claim is
incapable of being construed. To be clear, Exxon did not bar the possibility of doing
both as alternative arguments. In some cases where the construction was confusing,
the claims may not have escaped the “ambiguously insoluble” standard. See Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
(“In and of itself, a reduction of the meaning of a claim term into words is not dispositive of whether the term is definite.). However, presenting defenses in the alternative often undermines credibility as to both defenses. This is humorously highlighted by Bart Simpson’s classic defense; “I didn’t do it, no one saw me do it, you
can’t prove anything.”
204. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014). In Alice Corp., the
Supreme Court increased the patentability standard pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §101 for
computer-implemented inventions. Two years earlier, the Supreme Court did the
same for inventions directed to biotechnology. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
205. See Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY-O
PAT. L. J. 25, 27–29.
206. U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS 7 (2015).
207. U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM
(2017); U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS JANUARY 2021
IPR, PGR, CBM (2021).
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A. Definiteness by Category
Nautilus involved a claim term having a term of degree, i.e.,
“spaced relationship.” The general claim categories for purposes of
definiteness generally include terms of degree, subjective terms, measurement, and lack of antecedent basis. Breaking down definiteness by
categories208 offers insight into better claiming strategies.
Pre-Nautilus Results in Trial Courts by Category209
Category

Terms of
Degree

Measurement

Indefinite
Definite
TOTAL

19
38
57

1
9
10

Subjective
Terms
19
27
46

Antecedent
Basis
9
26
35
TOTAL
148

Post-Nautilus Results on Appeal by Category210
Antecedent
Basis
Indefinite
3
4
4
1
Definite
13
2
3
0
TOTAL
16
6
7
1
TOTAL 33
Post-Nautilus trial court findings by category yield some general
observations. Subjective terms and terms of degree were most frequently challenged. Subjective terms reflect the highest invalidity rate
at 41.3%. Terms of degree are a close second with an invalidity rate
of 32.8%. These observations are not surprising given the fact that
Category

Terms of
Degree

Measurement

Subjective
Terms

208. The distinction between the four categories is highly fact dependent. Hence,
the demarcation between categories can often be a judgment call. For example, some
might categorize “spaced relationship” as a subjective term. For that reason, the observations in this section cannot be definitive.
209. Twelve cases involve claim language and fact patterns that did not readily
lend themselves to the four categories and were excluded from consideration.
210. See U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 207.
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skilled artisans have greater latitude for divergent opinions in these
categories.
Terms of degree are most frequently challenged on appeal but have
the lowest rate of invalidity at 18.8%. Antecedent basis is least likely
to be challenged on appeal. This may reflect the fact that the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the patent office
and, as a result, tremendous experience concerning claim drafting defects, such as antecedent basis. Eliminating antecedent basis due to the
infrequent number of appeals, neither measurement nor subjective
terms fair well on appeal, as reflected by an invalidity rate of 66.7%
and 57.1%.
VIII. PATENT CLAIMS AND BRIGHT STARS211
The fact patterns of the successful and unsuccessful post-Nautilus
by category212 is not conclusive but may offer insights for purposes of
claim drafting and evaluating white space.
A. Terms of Degree213
Comparison of Sonix Technology Co. v. Publications International, Ltd.214 and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.215
illustrates that the terms of degree are not per se indefinite. Rather,
these two data points suggest that definiteness turns on clarification of
subjective claim terms. In Sonix Technology, the Federal Circuit noted
that the written description taught those of skill in the art how to construct measurement equipment that quantifies a term of degree.216 By
way of contrast, in Intellectual Ventures I, the patent in suit contained

211. Definiteness associated with means plus function claims/algorithms and
mixed method/apparatus claims have been excluded. These categories relate to a
different line of precedent. Indefiniteness associated with use of means plus function
claims directed to algorithms are subject to Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792
F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and its progeny. Indefiniteness stemming from mixed
apparatus and method claims are subject to IPLX Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and its progeny.
212. See supra Part IV.
213. The lines differentiating “terms of degree” and “subjective terms” are on occasion unclear. The authors have attempted to define “terms of degree” when presented with a range of values.
214. 844 F. 3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
215. 902 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
216. 844 F.3d at 1378.
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the claim terms “QoS requirements” and “optimiz[ing] . . . QoS.”217
The specification of the patent indicates the term is bounded by the
end-user’s experience.218 The hypothetical end-user provides no quantification and runs afoul of Nautilus.
B. Subjective Terms
Comparing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.219 and Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.220 illustrates that subjective patent
claims may be definite. Providing examples of noninterfering structures and the procedures for determining what is covered by the subjective terms is helpful.221 However, the definiteness requirement is
not satisfied by subjective terms that are unclear, unbounded, or that
have hazy relationships with the specification. For reaching the reasonable certainty milestone, subjective terms should be anything but
plainly subjective.
C. Terms of Measurement
The definiteness requirement for terms involving measurement requires some quantification. Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive,
Inc.222 illustrates this point. There the patent in question claimed a spinal fusion implant that transverses the width of the patients’ vertebrae.223 The Federal Circuit indicated that the relative nature does not
render the claim limitation indefinite. In upholding the validity of the
217. U.S. Patent No. 6,640,248; See Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
218. ’248 Patent.
219. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In DDR Holdings, the patents-in-suit related
to systems and methods of generating a composite webpage and included the claim
limitations “visually perceptible elements” and “look and feel” relating to a composite webpage. The Federal Circuit indicated that the specification described “look
and feel” elements as “includ[ing] logos, colors, pages layout, navigation systems,
frames, ‘mouse-over’ effects, or other elements that are consistent through some or
all a Host’s website.” Extrinsic evidence indicated that one of skill in the art would
interpret “other elements” as headers, footers, fonts, and images.” The Federal Circuit also pointed to the patentee’s own advertisements to support these limitations.
220. 766 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
221. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir.
2010). (a skilled artisan could review multiple examples in the intrinsic record to
determine whether a particular chemical bond would “interfer[e] substantially” with
hybridization).
222. 778 F.3d 1365, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
223. U.S. Patent No. 5,860,973 (filed Oct. 30, 1996) (issued Jan. 19, 1999).
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patent, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the variances are reasonably
well-known.224 In contrast, the Federal Circuit in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.225 held that the intrinsic record supported three different measurements for the claim term “molecular
weight of about 5 to 9 kilodaltons.”226 The Federal Circuit held that
the skilled artisan would be unable with reasonable certainty to ascertain the scope of the claim.
D. Lack of Antecedent Basis
There was only one Federal Circuit decision concerning lack of
antecedent basis. However, the district court case, RetailMeNot, Inc.
v. Honey Science Corp.,227 may be helpful. The claim elements of the
patent-in-suit,228 “the list” and “server,” both expressly lacked antecedent basis. However, amendments made during the prosecution history equated “the list” with “digital codes,” which was recited in the
claims. The magistrate reasoned that “digital codes” are the antecedent
basis. In contrast, the limitation “server” could have related to numerous servers. Hence, the magistrate found that it was lacking antecedent
basis. Her reasoning on “the list” supports the view that reasonable
certainty for antecedent basis is flexible.229
IX. CONCLUSION
Computerized research, artificial intelligence, ICT, and the IoT are
spewing highly complex and convergent technologies at a mindboggling pace.230 Corporate leaders know that success, or failure, hinges
on the time to market. In the meantime, large technology companies

224. It is noteworthy that the parties stipulated that the average dimensions of the
human vertebrae are well-documented by extrinsic evidence. Warsaw Orthopedic,
778 F.3d at 1371.
225. 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
226. U.S. Patent No. 5,800,808 (filed May 22, 1995) (issued Sept. 1, 1998).
227. C.A. No. 18-937-CFC-MPT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205723, at *49 (D. Del.
Nov. 27, 2019).
228. U.S. Patent No. 10,140,625 (filed Nov. 28, 2017) (issued Nov. 27, 2018).
229. RetailMeNot, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205723. The case settled prior to review of her recommendations. Nonetheless, there is nothing in Nautilus to suggest
that her analysis and reasoning was faulty.
230. Gearing up for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, EPO, https://www.epo.org/
about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2017/highlights/4th-industrial-revolution.html [http://perma.cc/G5TW-29E2].
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are continuing to weaken the patent system.231 This raises the question
of whether Nautilus has become another detractor like Alice or IPRs.
Post-Nautilus numbers suggest that definiteness is not a major concern. Yet, there is cause for concern. Courts are now presiding over
patents that were prepared and prosecuted squarely in the 4IR. The
number of definiteness challenges in court are rapidly increasing. As
a result, and because the invalidity rate has not trended downward,
courts are invalidating a higher number of patents. After a thorough
examination of the issue, there are two observations. First, an Exxonlike test makes more sense given the close relationship between claim
construction and definiteness. Second, the standard of appellate review for definiteness needs to be harmonized with Teva Pharmaceuticals. Lack of certainty favors infringers, not patentees. It is unlikely
that either will happen soon or perhaps ever.
Regardless of “bright stars” or “unreliable compasses,” the patent
community will be well-served by recognizing the value associated
with implementing best practices to satisfy the definiteness requirement in the 4IR. For the foreseeable future, the permissible scope of
patents during this unprecedented time will be governed by a statutory
framework that has remained unchanged since 1870.

231. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017).

